Optimal negotiation strategies for agents with incomplete information by Fatima, S. S. et al.
Optimal Negotiation Strategies for Agents with
Incomplete Information
S. Shaheen Fatima
￿ Michael Wooldridge
￿ Nicholas R. Jennings
￿
￿ Department of Computer Science,
University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZF, U.K.
￿S.S.Fatima, M.J.Wooldridge
￿@csc.liv.ac.uk
￿ Department of Electronics and Computer Science,
University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, U.K.
nrj@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Abstract. This paper analyzesthe process ofautomated negotiation between two
competitive agents that have ﬁrm deadlines and incomplete information about
their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on
many parameters—includingthe agents’ preferences, theirreservation limits,their
attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situ-
ations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of
these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial
information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine
how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy.
Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering all possible
ways in which time can effect negotiation. Moreover, we list the conditions for
convergence when both agents use their respective optimal strategies and study
the effect of time on negotiation outcome.
1 Introduction
Automated negotiation is a keyformofinteraction in systems composed ofautonomous
agents [3]. Given its ubiquity, such negotiations exist in many different shapes and
forms (see [7] for a taxonomy). Here, however, we consider a particular class of auto-
mated negotiation; namely, competitive bargaining over a single issue (price) between
two agents that both have ﬁrm deadlines. This is exempliﬁed by the e-commerce sce-
nario in which a buyer agent and a seller agent negotiate over the price of a good or
service. The buyer clearly prefers a low price, while the seller prefers a high one (hence
the competitive nature of the encounter). In addition to attempting to obtain the best
price, agents also usually need to ensure that negotiation ends before a certain deadline.
However, the end point may not be the only way in which time inﬂuences negotiation
behaviour. Consider the case in which the service is provided immediately after negoti-
ation ends successfully(say at priceP and time T). In some situations,it is not sufﬁcient
merely for an agent to ensure that T is any time less than its deadline. This may be the
case, for instance, because one of the agents, say the buyer, could be losing utility with
time as a result of notgetting the service.On the other hand, the seller may perhaps gain
more utility by providing the service as late as possible. Thus, in this case, the sellertries to maximize T (within the limit of its deadline) and the buyer tries to minimize T.
In short, it is clear that agents can have different attitudes toward time.
Generally speaking, the most common time effects in bargaining situations are [6]:
– Discounting: Beneﬁts received immediately by an agent are preferred to the same
beneﬁts received in the future.
– Bargaining Cost: The bargaining process itself may incur some cost to an agent.
– Sudden Termination: An agent may have a deadline beyond which it cannot con-
tinue negotiation.
In addition to time, the outcome of a negotiation typically depends on many other
parameters; such as the agents’ preferences, their reservation limits, and the strategies
they use. Although in most realistic cases it is not possible for agents to have complete
information about all of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon to have
partial information about some of them. For instance, an agent may have information
about its opponent’s preferences, or its deadline. In this paper, we focus on situations
where an agent has the following information about its opponent 1:
– A set ofpossiblevalues fortheopponent’sreservationlimitanda binary probability
distribution over these values.
– A set of possible values for the opponent’s deadline and a binary probability distri-
bution over these values.
With this information an agent can optimize its utility from price andtime. However
we do not assume that agents have full information about the preferences of their op-
ponent or the strategy that they use. It is known (common knowledge) that both agents
use a strategy that varies their negotiation stance with time, but the particular type of
time dependent strategy that an agent uses is not known to its opponent. Under such
uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit the available informa-
tion to select a strategy that maximises its expected utility. Moreover, when both agents
have this information about one another, we determine the impact of this information
on the outcome of negotiation. This analysis is important because it enables us to con-
struct software agents that will optimally negotiate on behalf of users given their state
of knowledge in a given context.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 dis-
cusses related work. Section 3 describes the basics of our negotiation model. Section
4 determines the optimal strategies for agents with incomplete information about each
other. In section 5 we analyze the outcome of negotiation when both agents use their re-
spective optimal strategies. Finally, in section 6 we present the conclusions and outline
some avenues for future work.
2 Related Work
Game theoretic research typically deals with coordination and negotiation issues by
assuming that agents have complete information about each other and then giving
1 This information is private in the sense that the values that an agent has about its opponent are
not known to the opponent.pre-computed solutions to speciﬁc problems [10]. However this perfect information
assumption is limiting because uncertainty is endemic in most realistic applications.
Harsanyi et al [2] give a generalized solution for two person bargaining games with
incomplete information. However there is no notion of timing issues in their model.
Another important model of strategic bargaining is the inﬁnite horizon alternating offer
game [11]. Since this has a unique solution, where agents agree on a split immedi-
ately, it has been applied to automated negotiation [5]. However while this model takes
time into consideration, it again assumes perfect information. Faratin et al.’s negotia-
tion framework [1] models time as agents’ deadlines and is not based on the assumption
that agents have perfect information. However in this model the agent’s utility functions
depend only on negotiation issues like price and quality, but are independent of time.
Perhaps the work that is most closely related to ours is that of Sandholm and
Vulkan [12]. In their work on bargaining with deadlines, they consider the probability
distribution over agent deadlines to be common knowledge. Speciﬁcally, they address
theproblemofsplittingtheprice-surpluswhichis known tobothagents.Theyshowthat
the optimal strategy is one in which agents wait until the ﬁrst deadline, at which point
one agent concedes everything to the other. Thus agents only ever make two offers,
they either demand the entire surplus or no surplus at all. This gives the entire surplus
of price to the agent with the longer deadline. But because of the offers made by agents,
the deadline effect completely overrides time discounting: an agent’s payoff does not
change with its discounting factor. In contrast, in our work we take a binary probability
distribution over agent deadlines, but we consider this to be private knowledge. In ad-
dition to this, we also take a binary probability distribution over the price-surplus. But
the agents do not know their opponent’s bargaining cost or discounting factor. Our opti-
mal strategies too give the entire surplus of price to the agent with the longer deadline.
However because of the difference in initial offers, our results bring out the difference
between the effect of deadlines and time discounting. That is, the deadline effect on
payoffs to agents does not suppress the effect of time discounting.
3 The Negotiation Model
We use an alternating offers negotiation protocol for our study.Let
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Given the fact that both agents have (different) deadlines, we assume that both
agents use a strategy that varies their negotiation behaviour with respect to the pas-
sage of time. Thus, time is the predominant factor used to decide which value to offer
in the next negotiation move. Here such strategies are called time-dependent (from [1]).
Before determining the optimal strategies (in section 4), we brieﬂy introduce the differ-
ent types of time dependent strategies that we consider. These strategies vary the value
of price depending on the remaining negotiation time, modeled as the above deﬁned
constant
￿
￿. As in [1], the initial offer is a point in the interval [
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￿
￿ that multiplied by the size of interval determines the price to be
offered in the ﬁrst proposal by agent
￿. Also the offer made by agent
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A wide range of time dependent functions can be deﬁned by varying the way in
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range, at the beginning it will give the initial constant and when the deadline is reached
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These families of functions represent an inﬁnite number of possible strategies, one for
each value of
￿. However, depending on the value of
￿, two extreme sets show clearly
different patterns of behaviour (see Fig. 1):
1. Boulware [9]: For this strategy
￿
￿
￿ and the initial offer is maintained till time is
almost exhausted, when the agent concedes up to its reservation value.2. Conceder [8]: For this strategy
￿
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very quickly. When
￿
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￿the price is increased linearly.
Thevalueofacounter-offerdepends ontheinitialprice(IP)atwhichtheagentstarts
negotiation,the ﬁnal price(FP) beyondwhichthe agent doesnotconcede,
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Agents’ utility functions. The utility derived by agents depends on the ﬁnal agreement
on the price
￿ andthe duration of negotiation
￿. However,utility fromprice to an agent
is independent of its utility from time, i.e., the buyer always prefers a low price and the
seller always prefers a high price. Thus:
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We consider the following two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions [4] as they
incorporate the effects of discounting and bargaining costs:
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2. Multiplicative form:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where, as before,
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ are unidimensional utility functions. Here preferences
for attribute
￿, given the other attribute
￿, do not depend on the level of
￿. This
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4 Optimal Negotiation Strategies
Anagent’snegotiationstrategydeﬁnesthesequenceofactionsit takesduringthecourse
of negotiation. In our case, this equates to determining the value of a counter-offer
which, in turn, depends on the counter-offer vector V. The information that an agent
has about the negotiation parameters is called its negotiation environment. In order todetermine an optimal strategy an agent needs to ﬁnd values for V, on the basis of its
negotiation environment, that maximize its utility. Since an agent’s utility depends on
two parameters, price and time (see section 3), it determines the optimal price
￿
￿ and
the optimal time
￿
￿ forreachinganagreement. An optimal strategythusmakes counter-
offers that result in the negotiation outcome (
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￿).
4.1 Negotiation Environments
We model the negotiation environment
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where:
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￿ denotes a two element vector that contains possible values for
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￿ on the basis of which the seller selects an optimal strat-
egy;
–
￿
￿denotes the buyer’s deadline;
–
￿
￿ denotes the buyer’s reservation price;
–
￿
￿ denotes the buyer’s utility which is a function of price and time that decreases
with price and either increases or decreases with time.
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the agent’s private information. Our aim is to determine optimal strategies for agents by
considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Thus depending on
the type of utility function
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The environment for the seller can be deﬁned analogously.Price
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4.2 Negotiation Strategies
We formally deﬁne an agent’s strategy
￿
￿
￿
￿ as a function that maps its negotiation
environment,
￿
￿, and time,
￿, to the counter-offer vector at time (
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For any environment
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿ denotes the corresponding optimal strategy. The op-
timal strategies are determined for each of the above six environments. An optimal
strategy should result in agreement at the optimal price and at the optimal time. An
agent’s preference for price is independent of time, i.e., the buyer always prefers a low
price and the seller always prefers a high price . We therefore determine the optimal
strategy assuming
￿
￿
￿
￿(section 4.3). This gives the optimal time for reaching agree-
ment. Then for this optimal time we ﬁnd the strategy that gives the optimal price by
taking the actual value of
￿
￿. This is explained in section 4.4. The resulting strategy is
therefore optimal in both time and price.
4.3 Optimal Strategies in Particular Environments when
￿
￿
￿
￿
This section details the optimal strategy for each of the environments noted above. The
analysis is from the perspective of the buyer, although strategies for the seller can be
deﬁned analogously.
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￿
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￿. On the other hand, if
￿ uses strategy
￿
￿
￿, it gets a utility of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
withprobability
￿
￿ anda utilityof
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ with probability(
￿
￿
￿
￿).So its expected
utility from strategy
￿
￿
￿ becomes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Turning now to an experimental evaluation of these strategies. Agent
￿’s utility was
deﬁned as follows 2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
￿
￿
Thus
￿’s utility linearly increases with price and time where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ gives
a value between 0 and 1. The expected utility to
￿ from any strategy depends on the
following parameters:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Let
￿
￿
￿ denote the length of time
interval between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿. For all contexts we assigned
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . In our experiments we computed the expected utility for
2 In all the experiments reported in this section we obtained similar results for additive and
multiplicative forms of utility functions. We therefore describe here the experiments for only
one multiplicative form.EU
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Fig.4. Effect of
￿ on the EU to buyer in
￿
￿
different values of
￿
￿
￿. For each value of
￿
￿
￿ we varied
￿
￿ between 0 and 1 and found the
￿
￿
￿ ineachcase.Intheﬁrst termfor
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿, bothparameters to
￿
￿, i.e.,
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿, are constants. In the second term,
￿
￿
￿ is constant but
￿ could be any value
in the interval
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿ depending on the strategy that the seller uses. As a result we get
a range of values for
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿. Since utility to
￿ is an increasing function
of time, for the same price
￿
￿
￿,
￿ gets maximum utility at
￿
￿
￿ and minimum utility at
￿
￿
￿. All other possible values for
￿
￿
￿ lie within this range. We therefore computed the
average
￿
￿
￿ for every value of
￿
￿. All the parameters to
￿
￿ in the
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿ are constants. This gives a single value for
￿
￿
￿ for every value of
￿
￿.
The results of this experiment for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are as shown in Fig. 3. For values of
￿
￿ up to 0.3, strategy
￿
￿
￿ gives a higher
￿
￿
￿ than the average
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿.
For higher values of
￿
￿, the average
￿
￿
￿ from
￿
￿
￿ becomes higher than the
￿
￿
￿ from
￿
￿
￿. Let
￿
￿
￿ denote the value of
￿
￿ below which
￿
￿
￿ is better than
￿
￿
￿ and above which
￿
￿
￿ is better than
￿
￿
￿. This value of
￿
￿
￿ depends on the value of
￿
￿
￿. As we increased
￿
￿
￿,
there was a corresponding increase in the value of
￿
￿
￿. A decrease in
￿
￿
￿ resulted in a
corresponding decrease in
￿
￿
￿. Thus the optimal strategy
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿ when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Environment
￿
￿
￿. Asoneofthepossibledeadlines fortheseller,
￿
￿
￿,is greaterthan
￿
￿,
￿ needs to concede up to
￿
￿ in order to maximize its chances of reaching an agreement.
Again it could use one of two possible strategies (see Fig. 2B). A strategy
￿
￿
￿ that starts
at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and approaches
￿
￿ at
￿
￿ by crossing
￿
￿
￿ at
￿
￿
￿, or a strategy
￿
￿
￿ that starts at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and approaches
￿
￿ at
￿
￿, crossing
￿
￿
￿ somewhere in the interval between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿. That is,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Boulware
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Boulware,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Boulware,
￿
￿
￿ for all values of
￿.
By using
￿
￿
￿,
￿ gets a utility of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ with probability
￿
￿ and utility
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿Price Price
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Fig.5. Optimal buyer strategies when utility decreases with time
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ with probability
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
￿ denotes theprobabilitythat theseller crosses
￿
￿ prior to
￿
￿. So the expected utility to
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
If
￿ uses strategy
￿
￿
￿ it gets a utility of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ with probability
￿
￿ and a utility of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ with probability
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.S o
￿’s expected utility from
￿
￿
￿ becomes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
In our experimental evaluation of these strategies, we get a range of values for
￿
￿
￿
from both strategies
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿. We assigned
￿
￿
￿ . The results of our experiments (for
the same values of all other variables as in environment 1) are shown in Fig. 4. The
average
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿ was higher than the average
￿
￿
￿ from
￿
￿
￿ for all values
of
￿
￿. Note that in this case the relationship between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ does not depend on the
value of
￿
￿
￿. Thus the optimal strategy
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿ for all values of
￿
￿.
Environment
￿
￿
￿. Since both possible deadlines for the seller are greater than
￿
￿,
￿
has to use a strategy
￿
￿
￿ that starts at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and concedes up to
￿
￿ by
￿
￿. Thus for all
values of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
!
"
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
In the remaining three environments
￿’s utility decreases with time, and it can max-
imize its utility by using a strategy that ends negotiation as early as possible.
Environment
￿
￿
￿. Here
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and the buyer maximizes its utility by minimizing
price by conceding only up to
￿
￿
￿ since it knows from its environment that
￿ will offer
￿
￿
￿ latestby
￿
￿
￿ or
￿
￿
￿.Inadditiontothisit canmaximizeits utilityfromtimebyofferingPrice
Time
P
s
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P
s
1
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b
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s
b
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Fig.6. Possible buyer strategies when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ as early as possible. Thus
￿’s best strategy
￿
￿
￿ is to offer
￿
￿
￿ every time starting from
its ﬁrst offer (see Fig. 5A). Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
for all values of
￿ and the counter-offers are always
￿
￿
￿.
Environment
￿
￿
￿. In this environment
￿’s best strategy is to offer
￿
￿
￿ from the start of
negotiationtill
￿
￿
￿.If
￿
￿
￿ is theactualdeadline fortheseller,negotiationwouldendlatest
by
￿
￿
￿ at price
￿
￿
￿. On the other hand, if
￿
￿
￿ is the seller’s actual deadline, negotiation
could continue beyond
￿
￿
￿ (depending on the seller’s strategy).
￿ now has to concede up
to
￿
￿ at the end of
￿
￿
￿ since
￿
￿ is less than
￿
￿
￿. The strategy
￿
￿
￿ is shown in Fig. 5B.
Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Environment
￿
￿
￿. In this environment
￿’s best strategy
￿
￿
￿ is to concede up to
￿
￿ at
the beginning of negotiation since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
$
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
for all values of
￿ and the counter-offers are
￿
￿ throughout negotiation.
4.4 Optimal Strategies in Particular Environments when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
The above strategies give an optimal value for
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿ . When
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿an optimal
value for price needs to be determined. There are two possible values for the seller’s
reservation limit,
￿
￿
￿ with probability
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ with probability
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
￿ now has
two possible strategies (see Fig. 6). It can concede up to
￿
￿
￿ by
￿ (strategy
￿
￿
￿) and get
an
￿
￿
￿ of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿EU
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Fig.7. Effect of
￿ on the EU to buyer
or concede up to
￿
￿
￿ by
￿ (strategy
￿
￿
￿) and get an
￿
￿
￿ of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
In terms of our experimental evaluation, the
￿
￿
￿ from any strategy depends on the
following parameters:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. We assigned
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .F o r
all contexts we assigned
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . We varied
￿
￿
between 0 and 1 and computed the
￿
￿
￿ for both strategies for each value of
￿
￿. The
results of this experiment are as shown in Fig. 7. For values of
￿
￿ up to 0.65 the average
utility from
￿
￿
￿ was higher than the
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿. For values of
￿
￿ higher than
0.65, the
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿ became higher than the average
￿
￿
￿ from strategy
￿
￿
￿.
Let
￿
￿
￿ denote the value of
￿
￿ below which
￿
￿
￿ is better than
￿
￿
￿ and above which
￿
￿
￿
is better than
￿
￿
￿. Let
￿
￿
￿ denote the difference between
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿. The value of
￿
￿
￿
depends on the value of
￿
￿
￿. As we increased
￿
￿
￿ there was a corresponding decrease in
the value of
￿
￿
￿. The decrease in
￿
￿
￿ resulted in a corresponding increase in
￿
￿
￿. Thus for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ the optimal price is
￿
￿
￿ and for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ the optimal price is
￿
￿
￿.
5 Negotiation Outcomes
We now determine the outcome of negotiation when both agents use their respective
optimal strategies as determined in table 1. Since the buyer and seller could either gain
or lose utility with time, we have the following four possibilities:
1. Both buyer and seller gain utility with time.
2. Buyer gains and seller loses utility with time.
3. Buyer loses and seller gains utility with time.
4. Both buyer and seller lose utility with time.
The ordering on the deadlines of
￿ and
￿ will be one of the following:Environment Optimal Strategy
￿
￿
￿ [
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Boulware,
￿
￿
￿] for all values of
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
[
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Boulware,
￿
￿
￿] for all values of
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ [
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Boulware,
￿
￿
￿]i f
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
[
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Boulware, (
￿
￿-
￿
￿
￿)] if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ [
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Boulware,
￿
￿] for all values of
￿
￿
￿
￿ [
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Conceder,
￿
￿
￿] for all values of
￿
￿
￿
￿ [
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Conceder,
￿
￿
￿]i f
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
[
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Conceder, (
￿
￿-
￿
￿
￿)] if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ [
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, Conceder,
￿
￿] for all values of
￿
Table 1. Optimal Strategies for the Buyer (
￿
￿
￿ denotes the optimal value for the seller’s reserva-
tion price)
1.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (D1)
2.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (D2)
3.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (D3)
4.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (D4)
5.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (D5)
6.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (D6)
We consider the case where
￿ gains with time and
￿ loses with time and determine
the outcome of negotiation for all possible orderings of deadlines. For ordering D1,
let
￿
￿
￿ be
￿’s actual deadline (see Fig. 8A). This corresponds to
￿
￿
￿ for the seller and
its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿. For agent
￿ it corresponds to
￿
￿
￿ (with a high value for
￿
￿)
irrespective of whether its deadline is
￿
￿
￿or
￿
￿
￿. Let
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ denote the optimal val-
ues for the seller’s minimum reservation price and buyer’s maximum reservation price
respectively. Thus when
￿ uses strategy
￿
￿
￿,
￿ uses
￿
￿
￿, and the outcome of negotiation
becomes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. On the other hand, if
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual deadline (see Fig. 8B), it cor-
responds to
￿
￿
￿ for the seller and its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿. For the buyer it is
￿
￿
￿ and
its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿ is low). The negotiation outcome now becomes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
In both cases, since
￿’s deadline is greater than
￿’s deadline, it gets the entire surplus of
price.
D2is similar to D1 except that
￿ and
￿ areinterchangedand thenegotiation outcome
is (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) when
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual deadline and (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) when
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual deadline
(see Fig. 8C and 8D).
For D3, let
￿
￿
￿ be
￿’s actual deadline (see Fig. 8E). This corresponds to
￿
￿
￿ for
￿ and its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿. For the buyer it is
￿
￿
￿ if its deadline is
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
(with
￿
￿ high) if its deadline is
￿
￿
￿. Using the corresponding optimal strategies, in both
cases the negotiation outcome is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual deadline (see Fig. 8F),
this corresponds to
￿
￿
￿ for
￿ and its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿.N o wi f
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual
deadline
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿ and the negotiation outcome is (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿); the
entire surplus of price goes to S. But if
￿
￿
￿is
￿’s actual deadline
￿
￿
￿
￿ with
￿
￿ low), its
optimal strategy gives the outcome
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and the entire surplus of price goes to
￿.
For D4, let
￿
￿
￿ be the seller’s actual deadline (see Fig. 8 G). This corresponds to
￿
￿
￿ for the seller and its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿ or
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual deadline
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,T TTT
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Fig.8. Negotiation Outcome (thick lines denote seller strategy and dotted lines buyer strategy)
then its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿ in both cases. The negotiation outcome is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The
entire surplus of price goes to
￿. On the other hand, if
￿
￿
￿ is
￿’s actual deadline
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
its optimal strategy is
￿
￿
￿ (see Fig. 8H).The optimal strategy for
￿ is
￿
￿
￿ irrespective of
whether its actual deadline is
￿
￿
￿ or
￿
￿
￿. The corresponding outcome of negotiation is
(
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿)o r(
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿), and the entire surplus goes to
￿. In the same way the outcome of
negotiation, if both agents use the optimal strategies as determined in section 3, can be
found for all the remaining cases. These results are summarized in table 2.
￿
￿denotes
the beginning of negotiation.
As seen from table 2, the negotiation outcome remains the same in the ﬁrst three
cases, i.e., when both agents gain utility with time, or when any one of them gains and
the other loses with time. This happens because the agent that gains utility with time
delays in making an offer that is acceptable to the opponent till the earliest deadline is
reached.Whenbothagentsloseutilitywithtime,theymakethemaximumrequiredcon-
cession at the earliest opportunity, i.e. the start of negotiation. Agreement is therefore
reached at the beginning of negotiation.
5.1 Conditions for convergence of optimal strategies
The values of
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ are crucial in determining
￿’s optimal strategy. For instance in
negotiation environment
￿
￿
￿, the agent’s optimal strategy
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿ when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿ when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Thus in order for the strategies to converge, an agent, say
￿’s,
degree of belief
￿
￿ about
￿’s deadline must be less than
￿
￿
￿ when the actual deadline for
￿ is
￿
￿
￿ and it must be greater than
￿
￿
￿ when the actual deadline for
￿ is
￿
￿
￿.Case 1, 2 and 3 Case 4
Deadline Ordering Seller’s Deadline Negotiation Outcome Negotiation Outcome
Buyer’s Deadline Buyer’s Deadline
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
D1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
D2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
D3
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
D4
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
D5
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
D6
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿) (
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Table 2. Outcome of negotiation when both agents use their respective optimal strategies
Similarly the optimal value for price depends on the value of
￿
￿
￿. For instance, for
the buyer, the optimal price is
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and it is
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Thus
convergence is guaranteed only when the values of
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ satisfy the following
conditions:
1.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for the buyer.
2.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for the seller.
3.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for the buyer.
4.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for the seller.
5.2 Payoffs to agents
The utility that an outcome yields to an agent is a function of price and time. The
factors that determine the outcome of negotiation are the agents’ deadlines and their
discounting or bargaining costs. We therefore analyze their effect on the utilities to both
agents.Effect of deadlines on the payoffs. As seen from table 2, when agents have unequal
deadlines, the entire surplus of price goes to the agent with the longer deadline.
Effect of discounting/bargaining costs on payoffs. When at least one agent gains util-
ity with time, agreement is reached at the earlier deadline; when both lose on time,
agreement is reached toward the beginning of negotiation. Let the pair
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ denote
the utility to
￿ and
￿ when both gain with time,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ when
￿ gains and
￿ loses with
time,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ when
￿ loses and
￿ gains with time and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ when both lose with
time. When the effect of time on the two agents is not identical, i.e., when one of them
gains utility with time and the other loses, the following result was observed. The agent
that gains on time gets the same utility as compared to the case where both gain with
time, i.e., for the buyer
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and for the seller
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The agent that loses
on time gets less utility with time gets a lower utility when compared to the case where
both gain or both lose with time, i.e., for the buyer
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and for
the seller
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
6 Conclusions
This paper determined what the optimal negotiation strategies are for agents that ﬁnd
themselves in environments with different information states. Speciﬁcally, we consid-
ered situations where agents have uncertain information about two negotiation param-
eters (the opponent’s deadline and reservation limit) but do not have any information
about their opponent’s bargaining cost, discounting factor or strategy. We listed condi-
tions for convergence of these optimal strategies and studied the effect of time on the
negotiation outcome. In the future we intend to extend our analysis to determine if this
mutual strategic behavior leads to equilibria and then analyze situations where agents
have limited information about other negotiation parameters like the opponent’s bar-
gaining cost, its discounting factor or its strategy to compare their relative inﬂuences on
the negotiation outcome.
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